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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Description of the Problem and Purpose 
In a pure and perfect market economy, unlawful State aids and Subsidies do not exist. The 
reality, either in the EU or in the rest of the world, is however different from this ideal market. 
Some state resources have been allocated to certain undertakings and businesses to support them 
in the recent time; this is broadly common not only throughout the EU but internationally.
1
 
Therefore, the recovery of granted unlawful aids and subsidies has a significant role in 
reinstatement of a level playing field between competitors in the same market after it has been 
distorted by these violative measures. 
However, as some legal researchers have noted “Finding an appropriate remedy in response to 
the illegal export subsidies will never be an easy task”2 and there are “Great concerns regarding 
an appropriate remedy for the use of export subsidies”3. By way of illustration, while it seems 
clear that the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (hereinafter the SCM 
Agreement), which is the main regulation governing subsidies internationally,
4
 seeks rapid 
compliance with the prohibition by recovery of illegal Subsidy in order to restore a level playing 
field between competitors, unfortunately it has often not been clear what withdrawing the 
subsidy precisely entails?
5
  
To make it clear, there is no definition of “Withdrawal” and its necessities in entire SCM 
Agreement.
6
 Accordingly, some related questions may arise. What does the “Withdrawal of 
Export Subsidy” mean? It is also not clear that if the effect of withdrawal of subsidies should be 
interpreted as a retrospective or a prospective remedy? Moreover, if the withdrawal to be 
interpreted as retrospective, should it includes interests at an appropriate rate in order to fully 
restores the status quo ante by depriving the recipient of the prohibited subsidy of the benefits it 
                                                          
1
 Even in the European Union, where State aid control is the strictest, it represents about 1% of EU GDP 
excluding crisis-related measures. See; The OECD Roundtable on “Competition, State Aids and Subsidies” 
2010, Par.1 of the Executive Summary 
2
 Tsai-yu Lin, Remedies for Export Subsidies in the Context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement: Rethinking 
some Present  Issues, 2008, pg. 23 
3
 Andrew J. Green, Michael Trebilcock and Vivien Milat, “The Enduring Problem of WTO Export Subsidies 
Rules”, American Law & Economics, Association Annual Meetings 2007,  pg. 34 
4
 Claire Micheau, “WTO Law and Tax Subsidies, Towards Establishing Jurisprudential Standards”, Bulletin 
for International Taxation, 2007, pg. 550 
5
 Andrew J. Green, et. Al, Ibid, Pg. 59 
6
 Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pg. 27 
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may have enjoyed in the past? There is no concrete answer to these questions under the SCM 
Agreement.
7
 
In comparison, according to the rules on the State aid- which is a similar notion to the Export 
Subsidies in so many aspects
8
- the Withdrawal or “Recovery” of the granted measure as a legal 
remedy for violation of these prohibitory rules, is well defined and obviously laid down in 
Article 14 and Article 15 of the Regulation 659/1999 (the Procedural Regulation).
9
  
Due to the similarities between these two notions, i.e. State aid and Export Subsidies, which will 
be discussed in the next part, this study seeks to compare and analyze the “Remedies” under 
these two sets of rules (i.e. recovery of illegal state aid and withdrawal of illegal export subsidy) 
to shed some lights on the ambiguities existing in regard to the Export Subsidies by comparing 
these issues to the State aid rules and other European jurisprudential literature. In other words, 
the implication of the EU Experience with the “recovery of granted measures” for the 
“withdrawal of export subsidies” is the main purpose of this research. 
The basic question arises at this point is that what is the relevance of Export subsidies under the 
WTO rules to the State aid regime under the EU law? This question will be discussed in the 
following part. 
 
1.2 The relevance of State Aids and Export Subsidies 
Generally speaking, those types of Subsidies, which according to Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM 
Agreement, amount to “Government revenue to be forgone or not collected” are of particular 
importance from the perspective of direct taxation.
10
 In these cases, a subsidy takes form of an 
outlawed tax incentive or tax credit. In this context, direct tax matters are clearly included in the 
definition of Subsidy.
11
 In this vein, subsidies are related to taxation.  
With regard to relevance of State aid and export Subsidies, in particular, since the both of these 
measures run a great risk of affecting the competition, and thus weakening the international 
market and the economy as a whole, it can be argued that rules prohibiting unlawful aids and 
                                                          
7
 Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pg. 27 
8
 See; Sec 1.2 below, and Chapter 2; Summary of this research. 
9
 Regulation No. 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of 
the TFEU, Official Journal L 83/1 (27 Mar. 1999). 
10
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
11
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
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provisions forbidding Export Subsidies both are designed to secure cross-border neutrality; to 
guarantee that these measures would not influence business decisions.  
However, it is important to stress that concerning the scope of the EU State Aid prohibition, and 
scope of Export Subsidy ban, provided for in the SCM agreement, there are essential differences; 
On the one hand, state aid is also prohibited in purely domestic situations,
 12
 while the Export 
Subsidy only applies to cross-border situations.
13
 In this respect, the prohibition of the State aid 
has a broader scope than the prohibition of Export Subsidies. On the other hand, Art. 107(1) 
TFEU requires that an advantage is granted to a “Certain” group of undertakings while the 
Subsidies look at the “Specificity” test. In addition, the notion of “State aid” has a broader scope 
and it covers positive benefits, such as subsidies and loans, and also measures that, in various 
forms, alleviate the charges that are “normally” included in the budget of an undertaking.14 
In a nutshell, an unlawful State aid and export subsidy both strengthen the position of 
beneficiaries compared with that of their competitors and this leads to the conclusion that “intra-
EU” or “international” trade is affected. In particular, the State aid rules and export subsidy 
regulations point in the same directions; they prohibit any distortionary grants made by member 
states, and they seek to “recover the granted measure” in such a way that it would remedy the 
distortion of competition caused by the effect of that measure.
15
 The main purpose of State aid 
and export subsidy control is therefore to maintain a level playing field and to protect the market. 
For that reason, it makes sense to consider and compare these two sets of rule in a joint review.  
 
1.3 Method and Material 
As provided, the purpose of this thesis is to examine and compare the Recovery of granted State 
aid and export subsidies particularly to provide a clearer picture of the “withdrawal of Export 
Subsidy” and what it entails. In so doing, the “Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
                                                          
12
 Marie-Ann Mamut, Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct Taxation; the state aid provisions of the 
TFEU in Tax Matters, Spiramus Press, 2010, pg 85 
13
 John H. Jackson, “The World Trading System, Law and Policy of International Economic Relations”, 1997, 
pg. 279 
14
 Frank Engelen, State Aid and Restrictions on Free Movement: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, European 
Taxation, 2012 (Volume 52), No. 5, IBFD 
15
 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada), ¶ 45, 
WT/DS46/AB/RW (July 21,2000) 
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Measures (SCM Agreement)” and the “Regulation No. 659/1999” have been the main sources of 
law and principal materials of this research in analyzing the remedies for prohibited Subsidies 
and unlawful State aids. To address the research questions the legal framework, specifically the 
State aid provision and the Subsidies Prohibition rules, will be outlined extensively in this paper. 
International literature on remedies available for Export subsidies and State aid will also be 
considered in this study. 
The approach adopted by the author in this research is to first explain the basic notions, 
expressions, and sources of law which have been used in this research. Then the relevance of 
State aid and Export Subsidies will be discussed in more details and based on the analogy 
between State aids and Export Subsidies the author tries to answer the question of this research 
by adoption of a comparative approach. The research aimed at filling the existing gaps in the 
SCM agreement in terms of withdrawal of export subsidies by taking assistance from the State 
aid experiences with recovery of unlawful measures. 
 
1.4 Delimitation 
As the topic of this research indicates the study aimed at consideration of “Remedial” issues in 
recovery of illegal Export Subsidies and prohibited State aids. The remedial alternatives posed 
by the SCM agreement jurisprudence have wide scope. Each one calls for a separate study. Due 
to this fact thesis does not, and cannot view all of these options provided in the SCM 
agreement.
16
 Therefore, since uncertainties regarding “Withdrawal of Illegal Export Subsidy” are 
more serious
17
, this research stays focused on this kind of legal remedy under the SCM 
Agreement. In other words, the research is limited to the concept, the scope, and the effects of 
“withdrawal of illegal export subsidy”, which is provided by article 4(7) of the SCM agreement. 
In terms of State aid provisions, in order to answer the questions of the research, the paper also 
stays focused only on the remedial aspects of state aid rules, i.e. the recovery of unlawful aid, as 
laid down in Regulation 659/1999 according to which the granted aid should be recovered 
without delay.  
 
1.5 Disposition 
In order to answer questions posed in this study and develop a deeper comparative review of 
“recovery of illegal state aid” and “withdrawal of illegitimate export subsidy” the paper is 
                                                          
16
 There are three main types of remedies for violations of export subsidies which are “withdrawal of the 
subsidy”, “countermeasures”, and “unilateral domestic measures”. See; Art. 4 the SCM Agreement. 
17
 Andrew J. Green, et. Al, Ibid, Pg. 34, and Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pp. 26- 27 
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structured in the following way: Chapter 2 deals with expressions and sources of law which have 
been applied in this research. Chapter 3 considers the recovery of granted measures and their 
effect in more details. This chapter tries to find an appropriate definition for the “Withdrawal of 
export Subsidies” and what this withdrawal entails. Chapter 4 deals with the impact of the 
“Principle of Protection of Legitimate Expectations” on recovery of unlawful measures, to 
address the question of whether the recovery of an illegal measure is compatible with the 
principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. And finally, Chapter 5 holds the analysis 
and conclusive remarks. 
 10 
 
Chapter 2- BASIC NOTIONS 
Before undertaking an in-depth examination of the recovery of granted measures under the SCM 
agreement and the procedural regulation, I present in this chapter descriptions for basic 
expressions and notions which are being used frequently in this research. This chapter considers 
the following notions: 
2.1. The SCM Agreement 
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) is the main 
regulation that governs subsidies internationally.
18
 The SCM Agreement is an outcome of a long 
development of subsidy rules that started by adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947.
19
 The SCM Agreement seeks, inter alia, to provide a definition for the 
“Subsidy” and defining the scope of outlawed subsidies which distort international trade.20 It also 
deals with the remedies and measures that can be taken to counteract the prohibited subsidies.
21
 
The SCM agreement in Article 4(7) provides for “withdrawal” of subsidies as a remedy. The 
meaning of withdrawal and what it entails is not clear under the SCM agreement. In this research 
I will, in particular, try to picture a clear definition for “withdrawal of Export Subsidy” and its 
effect. 
2.2. Definition of “Subsidy” and “Export Subsidy” 
The first agreement that defines a “Subsidy” is the SCM Agreement.22 While the GATT members 
applied this notion, there was not a thorough definition of the subsidy until the SCM Agreement 
provided a definition of Subsidy in the articles 1 and 2.
23
 These articles define “Subsidy” as: (a) a 
financial contribution (b) made by a government or any public body which (c) confers a benefit 
that (d) is specific pursuant to the meaning of article 2 of the SCM Agreement.  
To determine what does the “financial contribution” mean, the SCM Agreement indicates that a 
contribution may take different forms: (1) the practice of direct transfers of funds or potential 
direct transfers of funds or liabilities,
24
 (2) government revenue that is forgone or not collected,
25
 
                                                          
18
 Claire Micheau, Ibid, pg. 550 
19
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
20
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
21
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
22
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
23
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
24
 Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) of the SCM Agreement 
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(3) the grant of goods or services apart from infrastructure or the purchase of goods,
26
 and (4) 
payments to a funding mechanism.
27
  
The second type of financial contribution is of great importance for tax purposes.
28
 This 
form of contribution deals with public revenue that was not collected, although it should have 
been raised through taxes, and it envisages tax credits as an example of a tax incentive.
29
 As 
such, direct tax issues are expressly included in the definition of subsidy.
30
  
The Export Subsidies are, in a general sense, subsidies “granted only to products when they are 
exported”.31 Export Subsidies distort international trade, thus, the SCM Agreement prohibits 
these subsidies which are contingent upon exportation and upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods.
32
 
Regarding export subsidies almost all WTO Members agree that these subsidies definitely lead 
to trade distortion which is harmful to international trade.
33
 Accordingly, export subsidies on 
non-agricultural products are considered per se forbidden pursuant to the SCM Agreement.
34
 For 
that reason, in respect to non-agricultural products, members are obligated to avoid granting or 
maintaining subsidies which are contingent upon export performance, both in practice and in 
their law.
35
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25
 Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement 
26
 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement 
27
 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement 
28
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
29
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
30
 Claire Micheau, Ibid. 
31
 John H. Jackson, Ibid, pg. 279 
32
 Panel Report in Brazil — Aircraft, para. 7.26. 
33
 Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pg. 22 
34
 Art. 3(1) of the SCM Agreement  
35
 Art. 3(2) of the SCM Agreement 
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 This chart shows the position of “Export Subsidy” among other types of subsidies 
 
2.3 Definition of the “Specificity Test” in Subsidies 
Even if a measure is a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement, it is not necessarily 
prohibited unless it has been specifically provided to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries.
 36
 There are four types of “Specificity” within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement: 
 Enterprise-specificity. A government targets a particular company or companies for 
subsidization;
37
 
 Industry-specificity. A government targets a particular sector or sectors for 
subsidization.
38
 
 Regional specificity. A government targets producers in specified parts of its territory for 
subsidization.
39
 
 Prohibited subsidies. A government targets export goods or goods using domestic inputs 
for subsidization.
40
 
                                                          
36
 Introduction to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the WTO, WTO E-Learning Series, (2007) pp. 10-
11 
37
 “Subsidies and Countervailing measures, United Nation Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute 
Settlement”, United Nations, 2003, pg. 13 
38
 Ibid 
39
 Ibid 
40
 Ibid 
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The basic principle is that a subsidy that distorts the allocation of resources within an economy 
must be prohibited.
41
 In other words, where a subsidy is widely available within an economy, 
such a distortion in the allocation of resources is presumed not to occur.
42
 Thus, only “Specific” 
subsidies are subject to the SCM Agreement disciplines. 
2.4 Definition of “State Aid” 
Similar to what discussed regarding subsidies, in the EU context, State aid is, in general, 
incompatible with the internal market
43
 and one of the goals of the European internal market is to 
ensure that competition is not distorted, inter alia, by Member States granting aid to particular 
undertakings or categories of production.
44
  
According to the European law, the Member States have delegated their competences and 
supervision of State aid to the Commission and the Commission is required to keep under 
constant review all types of aid schemes existing in the Member States.
45
 Furthermore, the 
member States are required to inform the Commission any intention to grant new aid or modify 
existing aid.
46
 The member states may not implement such schemes until the Commission has 
permitted their plan.
47
  
State aid which is implemented contrary to this commitment is unlawful and must be recovered 
from the beneficiaries swiftly unless this would be in breach of a general principle of EU law, 
such as the principle of legal certainty and the principle of legitimate expectations.
48
 This 
obligation provides ex ante control and can be considered as one of the significant pros of the 
State aid provision which does not exist under WTO laws. 
To be caught as a state aid, it is settled case law that the classification of a national measure as 
aid requires that all the conditions set out in article 107(1) of the TFEU be met.
49
 Firstly, there 
must be an intervention by the state or through state resources. Secondly, the intervention must 
be liable to affect trade between Member States. Thirdly, it must confer an economic advantage 
                                                          
41
 Introduction to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the WTO, Ibid, pp. 10-11 
42
 Introduction to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the WTO, Ibid, pp. 10-11 
43
 Certain forms of aid are, however, considered to be compatible with the internal market. See; Art. 107(2) 
and 107(3)TFEU 
44
 Frank Engelen, State Aid and Restrictions on Free Movement: Two Sides of the Same Coin? European 
Taxation, 2012 (Volume 52), No. 5, IBFD 
45
 Art. 108(1) of the TFEU 
46
 Art. 108(3) of the TFEU 
47
 Art. 108(3) of the TFEU 
48
 Frank Engelen, Ibid. This matter is discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
49
 Frank Engelen, Ibid 
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on “certain undertakings or production of certain goods”. And fourthly, it must distort or threaten 
to distort competition.
50
 To ascertain whether the granted measure distorts competition and is 
affecting trade between Member States the Commission and the ECJ have taken an extensive 
scope.
51
 Even a measure which has a potential to distort the competition falls within the scope of 
unlawful state aid under Article 107 (1) TFEU.
52
 This approach aimed at protection of the 
common market from any potentially violative measure. 
To sum up, the notion of “state aid” has a broad scope and it includes positive benefits, such as 
subsidies and loans, and also measures that, in different forms, alleviate the charges that are 
“normally” included in the budget of an undertaking.53 Thus, the simple fact that the aid 
strengthens the position of beneficiary compared with that of its competitors leads to the 
conclusion that intra-EU trade is affected. This is in breach of Capital Neutrality which requires 
equal treatment of economic operators that carry out transactions in the EU and is, therefore, 
prohibited under the EU law. 
2.5 Definition of the “Selectivity Test” of unlawful State Aid 
What is understandable from the wording of the TFEU
54
 is that an economic advantage granted 
by a Member State constitutes an illegitimate state aid only when it favors “certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods”. This “Selectivity” test is in fact an essential condition for 
being considered as an unlawful State aid. A tax measure which confers advantage to certain 
undertakings or production of certain goods in comparison with other undertakings or 
productions that are in a comparable situation with the recipient may constitute a prohibited state 
aid.
55
 To put it another way, a general advantageous feature of a tax system which is granted to 
all taxpayers and is provided without distinction to all undertakings and to the production of all 
goods does not constitute forbidden state aid.
56
  
 
*** 
                                                          
50
 Art. 107(1) of the TFEU 
51
 Mamut, Ibid, para 322 
52
 Mamut, Ibid, para. 314  
53
 Frank Engelen, Ibid 
54
 Art. 107(1) of the TFEU 
55
 C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline. Para. 41 
56
 C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline, Para. 41. 
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Summary 
To sum up this chapter, taking into account the rules prohibiting unlawful State aid and 
provisions forbidding Export Subsidies, one can conclude that both sets of rules aimed at 
guaranteeing that the granted measures would not influence business decisions and alter cross-
border neutrality. In other words, the position of beneficiaries is strengthened by an unlawful 
State aid and illegal export subsidy in comparison with that of their competitors. Consequently, 
the measure in question distorts the “intra-EU” and “international” trade and should, therefore, 
be subject to prohibitory disciplines. 
However, there are some differences between these notions; State aid is prohibited in domestic 
situations as well,
57
 whereas the Export Subsidy only applies to cross-border situations.
58
 
Moreover, the notion of “state aid” covers positive benefits, such as subsidies and loans, and 
other measures which alleviate the charges that are “normally” included in the budget of an 
undertaking.
59
 Thus, the prohibition of the state aid has a broader scope than the prohibition of 
Export Subsidies. In addition, Art. 107(1) TFEU requires that an advantage is granted to a certain 
group of undertakings while the Subsidies look at the specify test.  
                                                          
57
 Marie-Ann Mamut, Ibid, pg. 85 
58
 John H. Jackson, Ibid 
59
 Frank Engelen, Ibid 
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CHAPETER 3- THE REMEDIES UNDER THE STATE AID PROVISIONS AND 
THE EXPORT SUBSIDY RULES 
In the previous chapter the similarities and disparities between State aid and Export subsidy were 
discussed. It was argued that these two notions are analogous in many aspects and as a result 
they can be compared in a joint review. In this chapter, the remedial aspects of recovery of State 
aid under the EU law and withdrawal of Export subsidies under the SCM agreement are being 
discussed in more details. 
3.1 Remedial Aspects of Recovery of illegal Aid/Subsidy  
From the perspective of law, a remedy is any of the approaches available at law for the 
enforcement, protection, or recovery of rights or for obtaining redress for their violation”.60 In 
this vein, the SCM Agreement provides for Withdrawal of the subsidy as a remedy for violations 
of export subsidies rules; Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement states that if the measure in question 
is found to be a prohibited subsidy the subsidizing Member should withdraw the subsidy without 
any delay. Unfortunately, while it seems clear the agreement asks for swift compliance with the 
prohibition, it has often not been obvious what exactly withdrawing the subsidy entails”. 61  
Therefore, there are some uncertainties regarding the “Withdrawal” of unlawful the Export 
Subsidies. In the SCM Agreement there is no definition of “Withdrawal” and its necessities.62 In 
addition, the effect of withdrawal is not clear; it is not lucid if the withdrawal of subsidies should 
be interpreted as a retrospective or a prospective remedy?  
By taking assistance from the rules on State aid and in line with the objectives and goals they 
both follow in prohibition of distortionary measures, this chapter seeks to shed some light on 
these issues. 
3.1.1 Recovery of Granted State Aid under the Procedural Regulation (Regulation No. 
659/1999) 
To compare recovery of prohibited measure under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement to Article 
14 of the Council Regulation No 659/1999, we must consider what do the “Recovery” and the 
“Withdrawal” of unlawful measure mean?  
                                                          
60
 Oxford Dictionary of Law, Oxford University Press, Sixth Edition, 2006, pg. 545 
61
 Andrew J. Green, et al. Ibid, at pg. 34 
62
 Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pg. 27 
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In the EU context, when a member state grants an unlawful aid, such as a subsidy,
63
 to certain 
undertaking or business, the aid must be recovered without delay.
64
 In this vein, the recovery 
means to reinstate and re-establish the situation which preceded the distortion of competition by 
the illegal State aid.
65
 Therefore, the recipient of such State aid is not only obliged to repay the 
aid in question, but is also required to pay the interest at an appropriate rate fixed by the 
Commission to fully restore the status quo ante.
66
 Insofar as the economic advantage of an illegal 
aid is not restricted to its nominal amount, the obligation to pay the interest seems appropriate 
and reasonable. Hence, by so doing, the beneficiary will concede the advantage produced by the 
prohibited aid measure and the preceded situation will be restored.
67
 Or as stressed by the Court 
in the Commission v Italy,
68
 restoration of the previously existing situation is achieved once the 
forbidden and incompatible aid is repaid by the recipient who thereby forfeits the benefit which 
they enjoyed over their competitors in the market, and the situation as it existed preceding the 
granting of the aid is reinstated.
69
 
Under the EU law, the recovery is, thus, designed in such a way that it would remedy the 
distortion of competition caused by the effect of the aid and reinstates the previously existing 
situation. In other words, the recipients of the aid have to pay the tax that they were supposed to 
have been liable for. 
3.1.2 Recovery of Granted Subsidy under the SCM Agreement 
3.1.2.1 Background 
Being part of the public international law, the remedies provided for in the SCM agreement must 
be studied in line with the characteristics of this law. Accordingly, before, turning to definition 
and interpretation of the effects of “withdrawal of Export subsidy” it is necessary to have a short 
look on the nature of remedies under international law.  
In the area of public international law, “cessation and non-repetition” is commonly considered 
the foremost remedy for an internationally unlawful act.
70
 This type of remedy also exists under 
                                                          
63
 Subsidizing a particular undertaking(s), is a form of illegal state aid; see: Frank Engelen, Ibid 
64
 Articles 14(2) and 14(3) of the Regulation No. 659/1999 
65
Martin Elofsson,  Recovery of Illegal State Aid from a Beneficiary’s View - The exception of legitimate 
expectations, the (mal)functioning air bag of the State aid policy?, 2009, pg. 15 
66
 Article 14(2) of the Regulation No. 659/1999 
67
 Case C-350/93, Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-699, paras. 21-22 and Case C-110/02, Commission v 
Council [2004] ECR I-06333, para. 42. 
68
 Case C-348/93, Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-673 
69
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the WTO system, namely the “withdrawal of the questioned measure” to be consistent with the 
WTO rules.
71
 In this respect, cessation has two legal effects in the WTO system. First, by ceasing 
the measure in question, the dispute will be resolved and this will remedy the circumstances from 
which the complaining party has suffered.
72
 Second, by bringing the illegal measure into 
conformity with the WTO laws, it finally leads to achievement of the objectives and purposes 
that the WTO law follows, such as liberalization of trade and sustainable development.
73
  
However, what is still controversial is whether a losing party has truly remedied the distortive 
situation, i.e., whether it has really “withdrawn” its measure that was recognized as an 
infringement of the SCM agreement or it has simply window-dressed the illegal measure while 
still keeping the distortive consequences alive.
74
 This question even becomes more complex by 
recalling the fact that there is no definition for “Withdrawal” under the SCM agreement. 75 
In particular, the question is whether the distorted competition reinstated by merely “cessation 
and non-repetition” if we interpret “Withdrawal” as such? In other words, when the granted 
illegal measure has strengthened the position of recipient in compared with of its competitors, is 
it possible to provide the equal treatment of economic operators and restore the situation existed 
prior to the granting of the measure by mere cessation and non-repetition? These questions will 
be addressed in the next parts. 
3.1.2.2 Definition of “Withdrawal of Export Subsidy” 
As it was already mentioned, the SCM Agreement does not provide a definition for 
“withdrawal” of the subsidy and its necessities.76 It is essential, therefore, to define it in line with 
the objectives the SCM agreement follows. In other words, to determine the meaning of 
withdrawal the author will take the teleological interpretation method to interpret it in conformity 
with the objects of the SCM Agreement. Accordingly, it is necessary to define withdrawal in the 
light of the objectives and purposes followed by the SCM agreement. In Brazil — Aircraft, the 
panel considered that the purpose of the SCM Agreement is to prohibit subsidies which are 
distortive to international trade. The panel stipulated that: The purpose of the SCM Agreement is to 
enforce multilateral disciplines in order to prohibit subsidies which are distortive to international trade.
77
 
The panel report also added, that it is for this reason that the SCM Agreement prohibits two types of 
                                                          
71
 Sungjoon Cho, Ibid, pg. 772 
72
 Sungjoon Cho, Ibid, pg. 772 
73
 Sungjoon Cho, Ibid, pg. 772 
74
 Sungjoon Cho, Ibid, pg. 772 
75
 Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pg. 27 
76
 Tsai-yu Lin, Ibid, pg. 27 
77
 Panel Report in Brazil — Aircraft, para. 7.26. 
19 
 
subsidies — subsidies contingent upon exportation and upon the use of domestic over imported goods — 
that are specifically intended to influence trade.” 78 
In another case, Canada — Aircraft, the panel considered that the object and purpose of the SCM 
Agreement could properly be sum up as the imposition of multilateral disciplines on the premise 
that some sorts of government interference distort international trade, [or] have the potential to 
distort [international trade].
79
 
In light of the foregoing, the SCM Agreement aims at protection of international trade from any 
distortive or potential interference of the governments. Reasonably, it leads to the conclusion 
that any violative measure must be recovered in order to re-establish the situation preceded the 
distortions. In other words, in the light of objectives of the SCM Agreement, it is understandable 
that insofar as recovery of granted measure is concerned the “withdrawal of export subsidy” has 
a meaning similar to the “recovery of prohibited State aid” under the EU law. To put it another 
way, the “withdrawal” indicates to remove or to take away what has been granted to the recipient 
of the export subsidy, similar to what was discussed regarding the recovery of an unlawful State 
aid. This standpoint can be affirmed by the reading of appellate body from the meaning of 
“withdrawal” in Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft. In this case, the appellate body 
defined the meaning of “Withdrawal”: 
“Turning to the ordinary meaning of “withdraw”, we observe first that this word has 
been defined as “remove” or “take away” and as “to take away what has been enjoyed; 
to take from.” This definition suggests that “withdrawal” of a subsidy, under Article 4.7 
of the SCM Agreement, refers to the “removal” or “taking away” of that subsidy. . . . In 
our view, to continue to make payments under an export subsidy measure found to be 
prohibited is not consistent with the obligation to “withdraw” prohibited export 
subsidies, in the sense of “removing” or “taking away”.80 
In addition, in Australia – Automotive Leather the panel stressed that to "Withdraw a subsidy"… 
differs from to "bring the measure into conformity", with the recommendation required pursuant 
to Article 19.1 of the DSU.
81
 
Taking into account the definition of withdrawal in these cases i.e. “to take away what has been 
enjoyed; to take from”, it can be argued that in a similar way, Article 14(1) of the Council 
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Regulation No 659/1999 has applied the word “recover”- however this recovery includes interest 
at an appropriate rate- this article stipulates that where negative decisions are taken in cases of 
unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all 
necessary measures to “recover” the aid from the beneficiary.82 However, the Commission shall 
not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Community 
law.”83 
What is now clear is that according to these two regimes the granted measure must be withdrew 
or recovered from the beneficiary swiftly. But the effect of this withdrawal is still an unanswered 
question under the SCM Agreement. In other words, it is not clear that if this withdrawal is a 
retrospective or prospective remedy?  
3.2 The Effect of Remedy; Retrospective or Prospective? 
There are some important questions concerning the effect of “withdrawing the subsidy”. 84 In 
other words, is the withdrawal to be interpreted as a retrospective or a prospective remedy? In 
the EU context, the answer is clear. According to article 14(2) of the Council Regulation No 
659/1999 the unlawful aid should be recovered pursuant to a recovery decision which also 
includes interest at an appropriate rate fixed by the Commission. “Interest shall be payable from 
the date on which the unlawful aid was at the disposal of the beneficiary until the date of its 
recovery.”85 The question arises here is that insofar as “taking away what has been enjoyed” is 
concerned and inasmuch as  prohibition of distortion of cross-border trade is the case,
86
 under 
both SCM agreement
87
 and State aid rules, is it possible to take a similar approach regarding 
Export Subsidies as it has been taken under State aid rules?  
In the author’s own view the remedial approach taken by the EU under State aid rules which 
provides for a remedy intended to fully restore the status quo ante by compelling the recipient of 
the prohibited aid to repay the benefits it may have enjoyed in the past, is a very appropriate 
approach for redressing the negative impacts of a distortive measure. The reason is that, the 
economic advantage of a prohibited aid is not only limited to its nominal amount but its interests 
as well. Under this approach, the recovery is designed in such a way that it would remedy the 
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distortion of competition caused by the effect of the aid and re-establish the previously existing 
situation by imposing interest on the beneficiary. Therefore, from this perspective this attitude 
seems to be a flawless approach.  
Regarding to recovery of export subsidies, the question on the effects of this recovery for the 
first time arose in Australia-Automotive leather case.  
3.2.1 Australia – Automotive Leather 
The Facts 
The Australia- Automotive Leather is a landmark case, since this was the first time that a WTO 
judicative body was challenged by this complex problem.
88
 The case concerned certain aids 
provided by the government of Australia to Howe, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Australian 
Leather Upholstery Pty. Ltd., which was owned by Australian Leather Holdings, Limited 
("ALH"). Howe was the only producer and exporter of automotive leather in Australia. The 
initial Panel order to withdraw the subsidy which had been found to be illegal. Howe reimbursed 
part of the subsidy which was considered to be the “prospective element”.89  
As an alternative, the government granted a new loan to Howe’s parent company.90 The United 
States argued that this was not enough and proposed a different formula for calculating how 
much Howe should pay off based on the “prospective portion” of the subsidy.91 In addition, it 
was alleged that the new loan was structured in a way that annulled any financial effect on Howe 
from the repayment.
92
  
The Issues 
In this case, the important legal issues were the “definition of withdrawal of export subsidy” and 
the “effect of this remedy”. In this case, both of these approaches to remedies were totally 
prospective; in fact, the panel noted that Australia, like the United States, argued that only a 
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“prospective” remedy is imaginable under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement.93 The Panel, 
however, rebuffed to bind itself to these arguments.
94
 The panel, instead, examined what exactly 
“withdrawal of the subsidy” involves.  
Decision 
Regarding to what the withdrawal of an export subsidy actually entails, the panel believed that 
according to the ordinary meaning of the term "withdraw the subsidy", read in context, and in 
light of its object and purpose, and in order to give it effective meaning, it can be concluded that 
the recommendation to "withdraw the subsidy" provided for in Article 4.7 of the SCM 
Agreement is not merely limited to prospective action but it may cover repayment of the 
prohibited subsidy as well.
95
 In terms of the effect of this remedy, the Panel was of the view that 
“withdrawal” is not limited to merely prospective actions, but it may include repayment of 
outlawed subsidies.
96
 The Panel concluded that complete repayment of the subsidy in question, 
however without interest, was necessary.
97
 
Implications for the Effect of Remedy 
Before implementation of panel’s decision in Australia – Automotive Leather case, it was 
broadly understood by WTO Members that the SCM agreement did not provide for retrospective 
remedies.
98
 In this vein, the decision in Australian – Automotive Leather which explicitly stated 
that to "withdraw a subsidy" is not limited to purely prospective action, but may encompass 
repayment of prohibited subsidies,
99
 was surprising and, therefore, several members countered 
it.
100
 However, in practice, it is still strongly anchored between WTO members that remedies 
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have only prospective effect; this is notwithstanding the fact that in Australia – Automotive 
Leather the panel provided for the retrospective effect of withdrawal of subsidy.
101
  
3.2.2 Advantages of the “Retrospective Approach” 
The proposed retrospective approach has some important consequences; 
1. The retrospective approach would have an ex ante control effect and it prevents the 
governments from subsidizing export products. Since the retrospective approach strongly 
discourages member states from providing subsidies due to the fact that they can 
anticipate that the recipient firm will normally not be able to repay the subsidy if it is 
successfully challenged through the WTO.
 102
  
2. It would also discourage firms from reliance on governmental measures with the potential 
of being considered contingent on exports out of a well-founded fear that, years later, 
governments would be required by the WTO to recover subsidies from undertakings or, 
even worse, export buyers.
103
  
3. When the recipient of subsidy is obliged to recover it without delay this recovery leads to 
reinstatement of the status quo ante; the situation which preceded the distortion of 
competition by the illegal subsidy. Accordingly, the member state is not only required to 
cease subsidizing the beneficiary, but is also required to recover it from the recipient of 
export subsidy. By so doing, the beneficiary will concede the advantage produced by the 
prohibited aid measure and it will protect a level playing field between competitors in the 
same market. 
The application of a retrospective remedy would therefore align with a view of the prohibition on 
export subsidies as responding to negative effects of disturbance of cross-border neutrality. This 
remedy would be more severe and consequently it dissuades the use of export subsidies.
104
 
The only question that still remains unanswered is; if we interpret the effect of remedy as a 
retrospective remedy is that in conformity with the principle of legal certainty and principle of 
protection of the legitimate expectations. In other words, would an export oriented firm, for 
instance, participate in a new investment if it knew the risk of withdrawal of the export subsidy 
and if it was anticipated it would be risked by being required to pay back the controversial 
measure? This question will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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*** 
Summary 
To sum up, there is no concrete definition for the “withdrawal of export subsidies” under the 
SCM agreement. In lights of the purpose of the SCM one can define it as “taking away what has 
been enjoyed by recipient of Subsidy”. This approach which entails recovery of granted subsidy, 
not merely ceasing it, can be affirmed in panels’ decisions in Australia-Automotive leather105 and 
Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft.106 The same approach has been adopted in 
connection with recovery of illegal state aid under the EU rules, although, under the latter rules 
repayment of interest is also necessary. 
What is still not clear under SCM agreement is the effect of this remedy. Before implementation 
of panel’s decision in Australia – Automotive it was broadly believed that the SCM agreement 
only provides for prospective remedies.
107
 However, notwithstanding the fact that in Australia – 
Automotive Leather the decision provided for the retrospective effect of withdrawal of subsidy, it 
is still strongly believed by WTO members that remedies have only prospective effect.108 In 
comparison, EU rules on State aid provide for a remedy that is intended to fully restore the status 
quo ante by depriving the beneficiary of the aid from the benefits it may have enjoyed in the 
past. According to article 14(2) of the Council Regulation No 659/1999 an unlawful aid must be 
“recovered” in addition to “interest” at an appropriate rate payable from the date on which the 
unlawful aid was at the disposal of the beneficiary until the date of its recovery.  
The approach adopted by the EU, appears to be more efficient in dealing with recovery of 
illegitimate granted measures; since under such a system, the member state in question is not 
only required to cease subsidizing the beneficiary, but is also required to recover it from the 
recipient of export subsidy, consequently, the preceded situation will be restored in the best 
possible way. In addition, by adoption of a retrospective approach towards remedies, the 
governments are strongly discouraged from providing export subsidies since they can predict that 
the recipient firm will not be able to repay the subsidy if it is successfully challenged through the 
WTO. Thus, it prevents them from subsidizing export products.
109
 In other words, this 
automatically, provides for an ex ante control in subsidizing export products. 
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Chapter 4- The Principle of the Protection of Legitimate Expectations 
4.1 Definition  
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations evolved in the laws of the EU from 
1970.
110
 The European Court of Justice has incorporated the legitimate expectations principle 
into its review of legality since the 1970s.
111
 It aimed at keeping the balance between public 
interests and individuals expectations.
112
 According to this principle if any person holds certain 
reasonable expectations with regard to future activity of the government, this individual can 
require those expectations to be satisfied unless there exist convincing public interest.
113
 To put it 
another way, this principle provides for security of participants on the market against any 
unreasonable and unforeseeable effects, as results of judicatures’ discretionary right to 
implement new rules or decisions.
114
  
The principle of legitimate expectations is similar to the principle of legal certainty, which 
ensures citizens to be certain about activities of the state that might affect their rights and be able 
to act according to the situation.
115
 The principle of legal certainty shall secure that a citizen can 
predict possible State action affecting him and act accordingly. Thus, legal certainty and 
legitimate expectations are interrelated principles, which provide a common justification in the 
need for security and predictability. The implementation of legitimate expectations and legal 
certainty principles has to generally guarantee the human needs of safety and predictability.
116
 
While applying the principle of legitimate expectations, the European Court of Justice stressed 
that “there cannot be any doubt about the law, applied at that moment in a particular area and 
about fairness or illegality of any law or actions”.117 
In other words, this principle prevents the retroactive application of the law, especially if it 
concerns the laws that establish any kind of penalties. Legal certainty is an objective value and 
has to ensure the processes of legislation and administration. 
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The question arises is that is it possible to recover an illegitimate measure when a government 
confers an advantageous measure to recipient and accordingly the beneficiary has legitimate 
expectation? 
4.2 Legitimate Expectations and Recovery of State aid 
Pursuant to Article 288 of the TFEU, commission’s decisions are totally binding for those to 
whom they are addressed. As a result, the Member State to which a recovery decision is 
addressed is obliged to implement this decision.
118
 In this context, the national court has no 
jurisdiction to declare the commission’s decision invalid and it has to implement it.119  
However, in the EU context, apart from de minis rule which indicates that an aid of no more than 
EUR 200,000 granted over a period of three fiscal years does not regard as state aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU,
120
 there can be some exceptional circumstances in which the 
recovery of unlawful State aid would not be appropriate.  
According to the “SFEI-doctrine”,121 national courts may refrain from ordering recovery when 
exceptional circumstances prevail.
122
 In addition to this doctrine, the Procedural Regulation 
imposes a restriction on the Commission's power to order recovery of illegal and incompatible 
aid. Article 14(1) of the Procedural Regulation provides that the Commission shall not compel 
recovery of the aid if this would be in conflict with a general principle of law. The general 
principles of law most often invoked in this respect are the principles of the “protection of 
legitimate expectation”123 and the principle of “legal certainty”124. What is important regarding 
the possibility to invoke the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is that this 
principle is only for the recipient of the aid and not the member state involved that may have 
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such expectations.
125
 In addition, the recipient can only claim legitimate expectations when they 
are the result of an EU institution’s conduct.126 In other words, a recipient cannot invoke 
legitimate expectations to Commission or ECJ because of any conducts done by national 
authorities.  
It is important to note that a review of the jurisprudence indicates that the ECJ has always given 
a very restrictive interpretation to these principles in the context of recovery.
127
 In particular, the 
ECJ has consistently held that, in principle, a beneficiary of unlawful aid cannot plead 
“legitimate expectation” against a Commission recovery order.128 For instance, in the 
Commission v Germany,
129
 the ECJ held that, if the aid has not been granted in conformity with 
State aid rules, an undertaking cannot entertain a legitimate expectation and a diligent 
businessman is normally expected be able to find out whether that procedure has been met.
130
 
4.3 Legitimate Expectations and Recovery of Export Subsidy 
In the WTO context, this issue raises the same question; would an export-oriented industry invest 
in new facilities if it knew the risk of retraction of the export subsidy and if it was expected it 
would be risked by being ordered to repay the measure at issue? 
The WTO, however, has not concerned itself at all with the domestic legal issues that might arise 
from its recommendations, reflecting a principle in international law that domestic law cannot be 
an excuse for not performing international obligations.
131
 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on 
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the Law of Treaties explicitly states that “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for the failure to perform a treaty.”132 
*** 
Summary 
The question that may arise in regard to implementation of a recovery decision is whether the 
recovery of an unlawful measure is in conformity with legitimate expectations principle and 
legal certainty? In the EU context, the answer is clear. Due to the fact that a diligent businessman 
is expected to be able to verify whether the aid he received was in accordance with the State aid 
rules or not, it has been always held by the ECJ that a recipient of prohibited aid cannot plead 
principle of “legitimate expectation” against a Commission recovery decision. In addition, this 
principle may be invoked only by the recipient of the aid and not the member states concerned. 
And the recipient can only entertain legitimate expectations when they are the outcome of an EU 
institution’s conduct. Therefore, a beneficiary cannot appeal to the ECJ or the Commission 
because of a national author’s conduct.  
The same question may arise in respect to withdrawal of export subsidy. Would an export-
oriented business invest in new facilities if it knew the risk of recovery of the export subsidy and 
if it was expected it would be risked by being ordered to pay back the granted Export subsidy? 
Being public international law, the WTO, has never concerned itself with the domestic legal 
issues that might arise from its recommendations.
 133
 This reflects an important principle in 
international law that domestic law cannot be a justification for not implementing international 
obligations.
134
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Chapter 5- Concluding Remarks and implications for withdrawal of 
export subsidies 
 
This contribution sought to provide an analytical and comparative framework for the Recovery 
of WTO export subsidies and EU State aids as a remedy for violation of the rules which prohibit 
granting of these unlawful measures. In the lights of all foregoing, it can be concluded that 
“Withdrawal” of Export subsidies, has a similar meaning to “Recovery” of State aids. The 
withdrawal can be defined as to “remove” or “to take away” the unlawful measure which has 
been enjoyed by recipient; not a mere “cessation and non-repetition”. To withdraw a subsidy also 
differs from to bring the measure in question into conformity with the recommendation of a 
WTO judicative body. Nevertheless, this recovery does not include the interest as it is the case in 
terms of State aid provisions. After the decision of WTO judicative body in Australia- 
Automotive Leather the WTO came one step closer to a more efficient approach in recovery of 
unlawful Export subsidies. Prior to implementation of panel’s decision in this case, it was 
broadly understood by WTO Members that the SCM agreement did not provide for retrospective 
remedies. This case for the first time indicated that the recovery of subsidy is not limited to 
purely prospective action, but it may encompass repayment of prohibited subsidies.  
However, contrary to what discussed in regard to State aid, the WTO’s judicative bodies are still 
reluctant to include “the order of repayment of interests of illegal export subsidies” in their 
decisions and to reinstate status quo ante by requiring the beneficiary of the illegal export 
subsidy to pay back what they have enjoyed in the past. It will be, therefore, interesting to see in 
the future how far that WTO judicative bodies will go in this respect and order for repayment of 
interest of an unlawful export subsidy as the EU implements in terms of illegal State aid. 
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